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Commentary!Sperber & Wilson: Relevance
further. What he offered instead were rules of thumb, or 
maxims, by which one could determ ine the effects of common 
purpose. But these rules of thum b are no more than that. They 
are proxies, promissory notes, for a theory of collective action 
that is yet to be developed.
S&W, however, spurn Grice’s observation and decline to 
develop any notion of “m atter in hand or “common purpose. ” 
W hen they characterize relevance, it is always divorced from 
what the participants in a discourse are really doing. “For us ,” 
say S&W (p. 161), “the only purpose that a genuine com m u­
nicator and a willing audience necessarily have in common 
is . . . to have the com municator’s informative intention recog­
nised by the audience. ” Perhaps. But even that intention cannot 
be recognized without seeing the potential common purposes to 
which the communicator s action is to contribute. S&W’s posi­
tion is like claiming that the only purpose I need in stepping on 
the car s accelerator is to put more gasoline into the carburetor. I 
do feed the carburetor, but that hardly accounts for why I 
usually take that action. I do it to speed up the engine, to turn 
the wheels faster, to speed up the car, to get me to my 
destination quicker, and so on. The “m atter in hand ,” the main 
purpose for an action, is often quite remote from its immediate 
effects. Likewise in communication. That was Grice s and Aus­
tin’s shared insight. So what S&W leave us with is a peculiarly 
em pty notion of relevance. It almost belies the title of the book.
As a result, S&W pass off onto “cognitive psychology,” with­
out further explication, what for many scholars are the central 
issues of pragmatics. Consider their idea that addressees take 
the decoded content of an utterance along with what is “m utu­
ally manifest,” weigh its “contextual effects’ against its “pro­
cessing effort,” and select the interpretation that is “optimally 
relevant -  that is, “the first accessible interpretation consistent 
with the principle [of relevance]” (Précis, sect. 3.3, para. 6). But 
what exactly are “accessibility and “processing effort”? Do we 
really select interpretations, as they presuppose? How are 
contextual effects weighed against processing effort? And so on. 
Paradoxically, to answer these questions, we would need just 
the notions of collective action and evolving purpose that S&W 
are unwilling to provide.
Notions like these are already under investigation in the 
literature on conversation and other types of discourse, but 
S&W pass them over. In the end, however, they will not be able 
to duck the question “relevant to what?
Layers of communication. Many types of discourse have more 
than one distinct layer of action or communication (Bruce 1981; 
Clark 1987; Goffman 1974). S&W, however, presuppose that all 
communication is flat -  that it has only one layer, one type of 
relevance. That, I suggest, leads to a misrepresentation of many 
important phenom ena in communication.
Layering is easiest to recognize in fiction -  novels, plays, 
short stories, jokes, films -  though it is common elsewhere too. 
In Herman Melville’s novel Moby D ick , the narrator Ishmael is 
telling some landsmen, perhaps in a Nantucket tavern, about his 
whaling adventures. Call this domain 1. Yet everything in 
domain 1 -  Ishmael, his audience, his adventures, and  his 
narrative -  are Melville’s inventions, and in writing the novel, 
he “communicated that narrative to us readers. Call this 
domain 2. (One can argue for another domain between 1 and 2, 
but it is not needed to make the point.) Likewise, in Hamlet, 
Hamlet talks with Ophelia in a fictional domain 1, but Shake­
speare “communicates” that conversation to us playgoers in 
domain 2 (via actors in yet another domain pretending to be 
Hamlet and Ophelia). All fiction has at least two domains, two 
layers.
How does relevence theory apply? In domain 1, the theory 
might claim that, fictionally, when Ishmael says, “Call me 
Ishm ael,” he has “informative” and “communicative inten­
tions” toward his Nantucket audience, and they in turn presum e 
that his utterance is relevant to them. The theory might also 
apply when Hamlet tells Ophelia, “Get thee to a nunnery .”
What about domain 2? W hen Melville writes for us, “Call me 
Ishm ael,” we a ren ’t to call him  Ishmael. Nor is Shakespeare 
asking us (or Ophelia or the actress playing Ophelia) to hie off to 
some “nunnery” -  some brothel. Domain 2 is somehow very 
different from domain 1.
Relevance theory doesn’t go beyond the surface layer. It has 
nothing to say about domain 2, even if we avail ourselves of 
S&W ’s notion of ‘ ‘interpretation or “interpretive representa­
tion.” H ere is why. Melville and Shakespeare have intentions 
toward us, but these are not “informative or “communicative 
intentions” -  they do not constitute the Gricean speaker’s 
meaning (Clark 1987) -  and the principle of relevance does not 
apply. So when Melville and Shakespeare “com m unicate” with 
us, it is communication of a fundamentally different type. This 
has a surprising but demonstrable consequence. Even if rele­
vance theory could explain how the Nantucket landsmen under­
stood Ishmael, and how Ophelia understood Hamlet, it would 
not explain how we do. Relevance theory simply does not apply 
to a great deal of our most cherished communication.
Relevance theory has a long way to go to become a full theory 
of communication and cognition. It cannot work, I suggest, 
without well-developed notions of collective action and layer­
ing. But can it accommodate these without being stretched 
beyond the breaking point? That may be the next test of the 
trans-Channel alliance.
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These brief remarks will be addressed to Sperber & Wilson’s 
(S&W’s) view of verbal communication. First, S&W draw a 
distinction between two separate processes of comprehension: a 
decoding process and an inferential process. They are prin­
cipally concerned with the operation of the latter; the former 
they dismiss as automatic and therefore “not so much a part of 
the comprehension process as something that precedes the real 
work of understanding” (p. 177). Second, they imply that the 
work of understanding (though “real”) is less than the work of 
speaking; the brunt of the work in communication is borne by 
the speaker. “It is left to the communicator to make correct 
assumptions about the codes and contextual information that the 
audience will have. . . . The responsibility for avoiding misun­
derstandings also lies with the speaker” (p. 43). “If the speaker 
has done her job properly, the end of the utterance should 
confirm all the provisional choices . . . that have been made 
along the rou te” (p. 208).
This picture is distinctly unfair to the hard-pressed hearer. 
Hearers are presented with signals which are for the most part 
semantically, syntactically, lexically, and phonologically unpre­
dictable; moreover, the signals arrive in a noisy channel and are 
frequently subject to considerable distortion and attenuation. 
Speakers, on the other hand, have in principle a free hand in 
what they choose to say and how they choose to say it. S&W’s 
principle of relevance is based on the observation that speakers 
do not take advantage of this freedom; in contrast, they constrain 
their utterances quite severely in order to make life easier for 
hearers.
In fact, S&W have here revealed only the tip of an iceberg. 
Speakers construct their speech output so as to cater to listeners’ 
needs in a far more detailed fashion than is captured by the
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guarantee of relevance or by Grice’s injunctions to speakers not 
to bore, puzzle, offend, or deceive audiences. In particular, 
there is abundant evidence that speakers adjust their output to 
assist the listener at those levels which S&W claim are the 
subject of “automatic processing -  even at the level of segment 
production, as the following examples will show.
On the one hand, consider the inhibition of certain pho­
nological rules of elision and assimilation. The application of 
such rules can result in a distortion, in casual speech, of phonetic 
segments which would be clearly articulated in more formal 
speech (Cooper & Paccia-Cooper 1980; Kaisse 1985); for exam­
ple, the sequence [tj] can become the affricated segment [t§]. 
This palatalisation rule can apply across word boundaries, as in 
“Meetcha after work?” Cooper and Paccia-Cooper investigated 
the applicability of such palatalisation as a function of the 
informativeness of words preceding and following the bound­
ary. For example, they varied word frequency of occurrence, 
comparing relatively common words (“rode your horse”; “had 
utensils”) with much less frequent ones (“goad your horse”; 
“had euglena”). Varying the frequency of the word preceding 
the boundary had no effect on the frequency of palatalisation 
across the boundary; but varying the frequency of the word after 
the boundary had a strong effect -  palatalisation was used 
significantly less often before rare words. Cooper and Paccia- 
Cooper also looked at the effect of contrastively stressing each 
word; again, stressing preceding words had no significant effect 
on the applicability of palatalisation, but stressing following 
words almost completely inhibited it.
In other words, distorting the ends of words is something 
speakers are fairly happy to do; but they are reluctant to distort 
word beginnings if the words are either rare or contrastively 
stressed, that is, if their information value is high. The begin­
ning is the most important part of a word for the listener -  
distortion of word onsets disrupts word recognition far more 
than distortion of later segments (Bagiev 1900; Cole 1973; 
Marslen-Wilson & Welsh 1978). So the speakers in Cooper and 
Paccia-Cooper’s studies were clearly making phonological 
choices in such a way as to minimise disruption to the listener.
The same kind of motivation can be discerned in a pattern 
observed by Cutler (1983) in the correction of slips of the 
tongue. Errors of lexical stress occur quite frequently -  synTAX  
for SYNtax, origin for Origin. Mostly such errors remain uncor­
rected by the speaker. This should cause the hearer little 
problem, since prosodic stress plays no role in word recognition 
(Cutler 1986); the hearer will probably notice a mismatch 
between spoken form and canonical lexical form, but will be 
readily able to discount it (cf. p. 23). What does disrupt word 
recognition, though, is getting vowel quality wrong -  substitut­
ing a full for a reduced vowel or vice versa (Bond & Small 1983). 
So it is not surprising to find that precisely those stress errors 
which result in a change of vowel quality are the stress errors 
most likely to be corrected. Thus origin, in which a full vowel in 
the initial syllable has been replaced by a reduced vowel, and a 
reduced vowel in the second syllable has been replaced by a full 
vowel, is much more likely to be corrected by the speaker than 
synTAX, in which both vowels are full in both target and error.
These segment-level instances of perceptually driven speak­
ing are striking; but one could easily add many instances at the 
lexical level (such as the tendency for nonce formations not to 
distort the real words on which they are based; Cutler 1980) or at 
the prosodic level (such as the fact that the greater the semantic 
contrast between a lexical slip of the tongue and the intended 
word, the more likely it is that the speaker will draw hearers’ 
attention to a correction of that slip by stressing it; Levelt & 
Cutler 1983). Seen in this light, speakers’ attention to ensuring 
relevance is merely one end of a continuum of hearer-coddling; 
there is certainly nothing special about it, and nothing that 
makes attention to hearers inference processes qualitatively 
different from attention to hearers’ decoding processes.
Thus, there is a sense in which the task of the speaker extends 
beyond the translation of a message into a spoken output;
speakers take upon themselves some responsibility for ensuring 
that hearers successfully accomplish understanding. But they 
do this purely out of self-interest, to ensure that their message 
gets across, and they do it precisely because the task of the 
listener is intrinsically so much harder than the task of the 
speaker. Particularly, it is harder at exactly those levels which 
Sperber & Wilson dismiss as the province of automatic and 
reflex processing. At these levels speakers strive to ensure 
reception of their message by hearers. Decoding is part of the 
work of understanding too.
Relevance and mutual knowledge
Martin Davies
Philosophy Department, Birkbeck College, University of London, Malet 
Street, London WC1E 7HX, England
It is common for philosophers of language to abstract from 
considerations of context dependence. The resulting picture of 
language is an idealised one; but the assumption behind much 
work over the last twenty years is that the idealisation does no 
serious theoretical damage. This assumption is, in turn, nour­
ished by the idea that context dependence in general can be 
treated on the model of the indexicality exhibited by the word 
“I”. The meaning of “I” specifies a very simple rule for assigning 
a reference relative to a context. Give or take “I ,” “h e re ,” 
“now ,” and a few other expressions to be treated on the same 
lines, the linguistic meaning of a sentence will determ ine a 
proposition expressed and, in particular, will determ ine truth 
conditions.
One of the major virtues of Sperber & Wilson’s (S&W’s) 
Relevance is its stress upon the fact that the common picture is 
not just idealised but mythological; tru th  conditions are radi­
cally underdeterm ined  by linguistic meaning.
W hether or not the bold claims for relevance theory can be 
sustained at every point, the treatm ent of m etaphor in Rele­
vance and the subsequent paper (Sperber & Wilson 1986b) is a 
real advance. It shows that the apparent dichotomy between 
speaker-meaning accounts of m etaphor following Searle (1979) 
and “seeing as” accounts following Davidson (1978) is spurious, 
thus correcting an impression given, for example, by Davies 
(1983). And it gives some determ inate  theoretical substance to 
the suggestion of Blackburn (1984, pp. 171-79) that a metaphor 
is an “invitation to explore” a comparison or image.
The radical underdeterm ination of truth conditions by lin­
guistic meaning is enough to show that something is seriously 
wrong with the code model of communication: Even in the case 
in which there is only a single determ inate thought to be 
communicated, the content of the thought is not fully encoded 
in the sentence uttered. But there is something else wrong with 
the code model as a model of human communication -  that is, 
communication amongst creatures for whom there is a dif­
ference between entertaining a proposition, or having a proposi­
tion presented as a candidate for belief, on the one hand, and 
actually going forward in judgem ent and believing the proposi­
tion, on the other.
If propositions really were encoded in sentences, and I were 
equipped with a mechanism for decoding, then upon hearing an 
utterance of a sentence I would be presented  with a proposition 
as a candidate for belief. This would be similar to the way in 
which, if I have a perceptual experience of the world as being a 
certain way, then the proposition that the world is that way is 
presented as a candidate for belief. In the case of perception, if I 
take my experience at face value, then I believe that the world is 
indeed that way. W hat is more, I usually do take my experience 
at face value. I do not require a justification for doing that; 
rather, I should need a reason not to take it so (cf. pp. 257-58, n. 
28). But still, the difference between perception and belief 
remains. In the case of communication on the code model, it
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